





anks and other ﬁnancial intermediaries are the main source of external
funds to ﬁrms. Intermediaries provided more than 50 percent of exter-
nal funds from 1970 to 1985 in the United States, Japan, the United
Kingdom, Germany, and France (Mayer 1990). Why do investors ﬁrst lend to
banks who then lend to borrowers, instead of lending directly? What is the
ﬁnancial technology that gives the banks the ability to serve as middleman? To
answer these questions, this article presents a simpliﬁed version of the model
in Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (Diamond 1984).1 The
results explain the key role of debt contracts in bank ﬁnance and the importance
of diversiﬁcation within ﬁnancial intermediaries. The framework can be used
to understand the organizational form of intermediaries, the role of banks in
capital formation, and the effects of policies that limit bank diversiﬁcation.2
Financial intermediaries are agents, or groups of agents, who are delegated
the authority to invest in ﬁnancial assets. In particular, they issue securities in
order to buy other securities. A ﬁrst step in understanding intermediaries is
to describe the features of the ﬁnancial markets where they play an important
role and highlight what allows them to provide beneﬁcial services. It is im-
portant to understand the ﬁnancial contracts written by intermediaries, how the
contracts differ from those that do not involve an intermediary, and why these
are optimal ﬁnancial contracts. Debt contracts are central to the understanding
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of intermediaries. The cost of monitoring and enforcing debt contracts issued
directly to investors (widely held debt) is a reason that raising funds through
an intermediary can be superior. Debt contracts include contracts issued to
intermediaries by the borrowers that they fund (these are bank loans) and the
contracts issued by intermediaries when they borrow from investors (these
are bank deposits). Portfolio diversiﬁcation within ﬁnancial intermediaries is
the ﬁnancial-engineering technology that facilitates a bank’s transformation of
loans that need costly monitoring and enforcement into bank deposits that do
not.
This article both simpliﬁes and extends the analysis in Diamond (1984).
Adding an assumption about the probability distribution of the returns of bor-
rowers’ projects makes the analysis simpler. There are a few new results that
extend the analysis because this article drops the assumption that nonpecuniary
penalties can be imposed on borrowers. The change of assumption implies that
there is a minimum level of bank proﬁtability required to provide incentives for
bankers to properly monitor loans. This article is not a general survey of the
ﬁnancial intermediation literature. Two recent surveys are Hellwig (1991) and
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993). For a survey of the role of debt in corporate
ﬁnance, see Lacker (1991).
Intermediaries provide services: this is clear because intermediaries issue
“secondary” ﬁnancial assets to buy “primary” ﬁnancial assets. If an interme-
diary provided no services, investors who buy the secondary securities issued
by the intermediary might as well purchase the primary securities directly and
save the intermediary’s costs. To explain the sorts of services that interme-
diaries offer, it is useful to categorize them in terms of a simpliﬁed balance
sheet. Asset services are those provided to the issuers of the assets held by
an intermediary, e.g., to bank borrowers. An intermediary that provides asset
services is distinguished by its atypical asset portfolio. Relative to an interme-
diary that provides no asset services, it will concentrate its portfolio in assets
that it has a comparative advantage in holding. The model presented below
provides a foundation for understanding this aspect of intermediation, showing
that reduced monitoring costs are a source of this comparative advantage.3
There are other important aspects of intermediation that we do not discuss
here: liability services and transformation services. Liability services are those
provided to the holder of intermediary liabilities in addition to the services
provided by most other securities. Examples include the ability to use bank
demand deposits as a means of payment and the personalization of contingent
contracts available from life insurance companies. Some liability services, such
3 Fama (1985) notes that banks issue large certiﬁcates of deposit which pay market rates
of interest for their risk but are also subject to reserve requirements, implying that the reserve
requirements are passed along to borrowers. This is evidence in favor of the idea that banks
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as check clearing, are well understood, while others relate to difﬁcult issues
in microeconomic theory regarding the role of money. Transformation services
involve the conversion of illiquid assets into liquid liabilities, offering improved
risk sharing and better liquidity compared with investment in the assets held
by intermediaries (see Diamond and Dybvig [1983] and Diamond [1995]).
Although there may be interactions between these types of service, this article
focuses only on asset services.
If intermediaries provide asset services, they provide services to borrowers
who issue assets to them. That is, it matters to the issuer of an asset that the
asset is to be held by an intermediary rather than directly by investors. Some
costs are lower if the asset is held by an intermediary rather than a large number
of individuals. The imperfections that give rise to costs of issuing securities
by primary borrowers also give rise to similar costs to an intermediary that
issues deposits. I examine how a ﬁnancial intermediary acting as a middleman
can lead to net cost savings, and I develop the implications of this role for
the structure of intermediaries. The model yields strong predictions about the
contracts used by intermediaries and this provides a setting to analyze important
issues in banking policy.
1. AN OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION:
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF MONITORING
Theories based on the collection of private information by an intermediary re-
quire that there be some beneﬁt to using this additional information in lending.
A key result in the agency theory literature is that monitoring by a principal
can allow improved contracts. The net demand for this monitoring also depends
on the cost of monitoring. This cost depends on the number of lenders who
contract with a given borrower.
In contracting situations involving a single lender and a single borrower,
one compares the physical cost of monitoring with the resulting savings of
contracting costs. Let K be the cost of monitoring and S the savings from
monitoring. When there are multiple lenders involved, either each must be able
to monitor the additional information directly at a total cost of m×K, where m
is the number of lenders per borrower, or the monitoring must be delegated to
someone.4 Delegating the monitoring gives rise to a new private information
problem: the person doing the monitoring as agent now has private information.
It is not even veriﬁable whether the monitoring has been undertaken. Delegated
monitoring can lead to delegation costs. Let D denote the delegation cost per
4 Another option is nondelegated monitoring with less duplication of effort, analyzed in
Winton (1995). Winton considers multiple prioritized debt contracts, only some of which need
monitoring. Because there is still duplicated monitoring, it is qualitatively similar to monitoring
by all m investors. To avoid complicating the analysis, this option is not considered here.54 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
borrower. A complete ﬁnancial intermediary theory based on contracting costs
of borrowers must model the delegation costs and explain why intermediation
leads to an overall improvement in the set of available contracts. That is,
delegated monitoring pays when
K + D ≤ min [S,m × K],
because K + D is the cost using an intermediary, S is the cost without moni-
toring, and m × K is the cost of direct monitoring.
The model in this article illustrates the more general results in Diamond
(1984), which analyzes delegation costs by characterizing the organizational
structure and contractual form that minimize the costs of delegating monitor-
ing to an intermediary. The ﬁrst step in studying the beneﬁts of intermediation
is to ﬁnd the best available contracts between borrowers and lenders if there is
no intermediary and no monitoring. The optimal unmonitored ﬁnancial contract
between a borrower and lenders is shown to be a debt contract that involves
positive expected deadweight liquidation costs which are necessary to provide
incentives for repayment.5 The gross demand for monitoring arises because one
can use lower cost contracts (with reduced liquidation costs), if the project’s
return can be monitored, with an ex ante cost saving of S.
Monitoring is costly, especially if duplicated. If not duplicated, the act of
monitoring must be delegated, and then the information obtained is not pub-
licly observed. As a result of the remaining information disadvantage of those
who do not monitor, there may be delegation costs associated with providing
incentives for delegated monitoring. The best way to delegate monitoring is
for the delegated monitor to issue unmonitored debt, which will be subject to
liquidation costs. The delegated monitor is a ﬁnancial intermediary because it
borrows from small investors (depositors), using unmonitored debt (deposits)
to lend to borrowers (whose loans it monitors).
2. AN EXAMPLE OF OPTIMAL DEBT
WITHOUT DELEGATED MONITORING
Consider a borrower who needs to raise a large quantity of capital. All lenders
and borrowers are risk neutral, but borrowers have no capital, and each lender’s
capital to invest is small relative to the amount needed to fund the borrower’s
investment. The borrower needs to raise 1 (where the units are millions of dol-
lars, and these units will be mentioned only parenthetically), while each investor
has 1/m units to invest, implying that a borrower needs to raise capital from
m investors if m > 1. The example assumes that m is very large: m = 10,000,
5 This analysis of optimal debt contracts is extended in Gale and Hellwig (1985). On the
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and each lender has capital or 0.0001 ($100). Monitoring the borrower costs
K = 0.0002 ($200), and duplicated monitoring by each of m investors costs
mK = 2 and is prohibitively expensive. Because monitoring is expensive, one
should examine the best contract available without any monitoring.
Investors do not observe the borrower’s operations directly, not even its
sales or cash ﬂows. How can the lenders write a contract in which they do not
need to monitor this information?
The Best Contract without Monitoring
The ﬁrm needs to raise 1 ($1 million), and each investor requires an expected
return of r = 5%. All lenders and the borrower agree that the borrower has a
proﬁtable, positive net present value project to fund, but only the borrower will
observe how proﬁtable it turns out to be. The borrower can consume any part of
the project’s return that he does not pay out to the investor. The interpretation
is that the borrower can appropriate the return to himself, since no one else
observes the project’s success. If the project is a retail store, the borrower can
take some sales in cash to himself. More generally, the borrower can inﬂate
costs. In practice, the net cash ﬂows to the ﬁrm are very unobservable for many
ﬁrms. In addition, most other conﬂicts of interest faced by borrowers can be
reinterpreted as equivalent to the borrower’s ability to retain underreported cash.
The ability to retain underreported cash is simply the most extreme example
of a conﬂict of interest.
The project costs 1 to fund, and its realized value is a random variable
with realization denoted by V. The distribution of V, the value of the project,
known to all borrowers and lenders is
H = 1.4 million, with probability P = 0.8,
L = 1 million, with probability 1 − P = 0.2.
A Simple Candidate for a Contract is Equity
An equity contract in this context is a proﬁt-sharing agreement, where the proﬁt
shared depends on the proﬁts reported by the borrower. Let the fraction of re-
ported proﬁts that goes to the outside investor be a, while the borrower retains
a fraction 1 − a, plus any underreported proﬁts. Suppose that the borrower’s
contract is just to pay a fraction of reported proﬁts, with no other details or
penalties speciﬁed. The borrower’s payoff, given the true value of V and the
reported value, denoted by Z, is V−aZ. What proﬁt will the borrower report if
he is supposed to pay out a fraction of it? The borrower will choose the smallest
value of Z. Supposing that the borrower can’t make the lender take a share of
a reported loss (by reporting Z < 0), the borrower will report Z = 0. A simple
proﬁt-sharing contract works very poorly when proﬁts cannot be veriﬁed. It
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of proﬁt. Even adding the requirement that proﬁt reports can never be less than
L = 1 does nothing to induce higher payments.
No matter what the true value of V, the best response of the borrower to a
proﬁt sharing contract is to pay the lowest possible value. If there is no cost to
the borrower of understating the amount, the borrower always does. Even if the
lender knows the value of V, if the borrower obtains it ﬁrst and thus controls
it, the lender will not be paid unless the borrower suffers some consequence of
not paying.
What Can the Lender Do If the Borrower Claims a Low Amount?
The lender would like to impose a penalty for low payments to give incentives
for higher payments. There are two interpretations. The lender can liquidate the
project if the borrower pays too little, preventing the borrower from abscond-
ing with it, or the lender can impose a nonmonetary penalty on the borrower.
Bankruptcy in the world today is some combination of these two actions. In
ancient history, the nonmonetary penalties were very common, i.e., debtors’
prisons and physical penalties. Such sanctions are now illegal, but the loss of
reputation of a borrower of a bankrupt ﬁrm is similar to a sanction.
Bankruptcy, Liquidation, and the Optimal Liquidation Policy
Suppose that it is not possible to impose a penalty on the borrower or take other
assets (outside the business) that are valued by the borrower. See Diamond
(1984) for analysis when these nonpecuniary penalties are possible. The only
sanction available to give the borrower an incentive to pay is liquidation of the
borrower’s assets (as in Diamond [1989, 1991]). To focus on the inefﬁciency
of disrupting ﬁrm operations, I assume that liquidating the ﬁrm’s asset gives
no proceeds to the lender or to the borrower. The results are similar when
liquidation yields a positive amount that is much less than the value of the
unliquidated asset. Liquidation and bankruptcy are useful penalties that a bor-
rower can avoid by paying the debt, but regular liquidation is not a good way to
run a ﬁrm. How does one specify an optimal ﬁnancial contract between investor
and borrower when one can decide to liquidate (to penalize the borrower) or
not, contingent on any payment?
Liquidation is best used as a payment-contingent penalty in the following
way. If the lender is ever to liquidate for a given payment, he also should liqui-
date for all lower payments. Suppose instead that the lender does not liquidate
if 1 is paid but will liquidate for some higher payment. Then, whenever the
borrower has at least 1, he will avoid liquidation by paying 1 and keep the
remainder for himself. This makes meaningless the threat to liquidate given
higher payments, because the payment will never exceed 1.
The borrower will pay the lowest amount that avoids liquidation, and keep
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to pay that amount. This implies a description of the optimal ﬁnancial contract
without monitoring: select a payment, f, that, if paid, avoids liquidation. The
lender then liquidates for all lower payments. This implies that the optimal
contract when monitoring is impossible is a debt contract with face f. The face
value includes the promised payment of principal and interest.
Determination of the Face Value of Unmonitored Debt
This section determines the minimum face value, f, of unmonitored debt which
will lead to payments with an expected return of 5 percent on a loan of 1 ($1
million), or an expected value of 1.05.
Suppose f = 1. When V = 1, the borrower pays 1 (paying less would
result in liquidation). The borrower gets 0, which is as much as if he paid any
lower amount. When V = 1.4, the borrower pays 1 (to avoid liquidation), and
keeps 0.4 for himself. This implies that with face value of 1, the lender gets 1
for sure, which is less than 1.05 and not acceptable.
Any face value of debt between 1 and 1.4 forces the borrower into liquida-
tion when the project returns 1 but is paid in full when the project returns 1.4.
This gives the lender an expected return of 0.8f, because nothing is received
when there is liquidation. Solving for the face value of debt (between 1 and
1.4) that gives lenders a 5 percent expected return solves 0.8f = 1.05 and
yields f = 1.3125. Unmonitored debt with that face value works as follows.
Suppose f = 1.3125. When V = 1, the borrower pays less than 1.3125,
and the asset is liquidated. The borrower gets zero for any payment less than or
equal to 1. The best interpretation is that the borrower chooses to pay zero when
V = 1 because it is the best choice when liquidation is generalized to allow the
borrower to keep a positive fraction of the retained cash. This leads the lender
to liquidate and receive zero, which occurs with probability 0.2. When V = 1.4
the borrower pays 1.3125, avoids liquidation, and keeps 1.4−1.3175 = 0.0825
for himself. This is more than he could get from any smaller payment: any
smaller payment gives zero. The payment 1.3125 is received with probability
0.8. Liquidation is only avoided when V = H and the face of 1.3125 is paid.
The lender receives 1.3125 with probability 0.8 and zero with probability 0.2,
which is an expected payment of 0.8(1.3125) = 1.05. Any lower face value
will give the lender an expected rate of return below 5 percent.
When outside investors cannot observe the cash ﬂows and cannot monitor
the business, equity contracts do not work. Enforcing them requires excessively
costly monitoring. If this monitoring (sitting on the board of directors or keep-
ing close tabs on the business in other ways) is too costly, then simple ﬁnancial
contracts that do not require monitoring are best. These are debt contracts. They
induce the borrower to pay investors because default serves as a penalty that
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The analysis can be extended to apply not only to defaults on principal and
interest covenants of debt contracts but to any other covenant whose violation
implies a potential default on a debt contract. Consider a covenant that might
be violated for a variety of hard-to-observe reasons. When it is too costly for
lenders to determine the reason for the covenant violation, the covenant will
“mean what it says,” and involve a default whenever it is violated, rather than
being renegotiated based on the reason for the violation.
The Value of Monitoring
Suppose that it is possible for the lender to monitor the value of the borrower’s
operations. Then, instead of liquidating when less than the face value of debt
is paid, the lender who monitors can instead use the threat of liquidation and
offer to refrain from liquidation so long as the borrower repays as much as
possible. Instead of always or never offering to accept 1 in lieu of liquidation,
the lender can offer to accept it when V = 1 but not when V = 1.4. This policy
leads the borrower to pay f when V = 1.4 and 1 when V = 1. I assume that
the lender has all of the bargaining power and will offer to accept less than f
only when V = 1.
The value of monitoring is the expected savings in ﬁnancial distress costs,
which are equal to 0.2(1) = 0.2. This is the savings from monitoring, S,
described in Section 1. This savings must be compared with the cost of moni-
toring. The cost of monitoring the value of the borrower’s project is K. If there
were a single lender, then monitoring would cost K. Duplicated monitoring by
each of m lenders would cost mK and would be equivalent to a single lender
facing a monitoring cost of mK. I assume that the cost of monitoring is incurred
ex ante, before a loan is repaid. Ex ante monitoring implies that the lender must
learn in advance about the borrower’s business to properly interpret any data
about the project’s return. In this case, the lender or lenders must establish a
costly relationship in order to monitor the borrower. The results can be reinter-
preted as also applying to ex post monitoring, where no relationship is needed
and where the costs of monitoring are incurred only when the borrower defaults
on the debt. If the lender or lenders can commit in advance to monitor if and
only if the borrower pays less than face value, the ex ante monitoring results
can be adapted as follows. In place of the ﬁxed cost of ex ante monitoring, K,
use the expected cost of ex post monitoring, which is the cost K, multiplied by
the probability that the borrower must default. If the borrower knows he will
be monitored given a default, he will default only when he has no choice, i.e.,
when V = 1 (see Townsend [1979]). The ability to wait to incur the ex post
cost of monitoring yields an expected cost of monitoring equivalent to an ex
ante cost of monitoring of (1 − P)K or 0.2K.D. W. Diamond: Financial Intermediation as Delegated Monitoring 59
3. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
If all m lenders monitor, and m is large, then the cost of monitoring is mK, and
monitoring is too expensive. If there were many large investors with personal
capital above 1, then monitoring at cost K would be available. With a small
supply of large investors who can lend 1 on personal account (fewer such in-
vestors than proﬁtable large projects), and no way to delegate monitoring, some
projects that would beneﬁt from monitoring will be ﬁnanced with unmonitored,
widely held debt. This section shows how ﬁnancial intermediaries can be set
up to create synthetic large investors. There will be a proﬁt opportunity to
set up such intermediaries if none are present. If there are few large investors
and no intermediaries, then loans are made at 31.25 percent. Finding a way to
make monitored loans at 31.25 percent can allow a banker to make a proﬁt.
If intermediation reduces the cost of making monitored loans and there is free
entry, bankers will not earn excess proﬁts but instead loan rates will be pushed
down.
Suppose that there are no large investors, only small investors each with
0.0001 ($100) to lend, and 10,000 small lenders are needed to ﬁnance 1 ($1
million). Suppose the cost of monitoring V is K = 0.0002 ($200) for each.
If each of 10,000 lenders were to monitor whenever there is a default on the
loan, the cost would be 2, which is prohibitive, and no one would monitor.
When the monitoring cost is prohibitive, the optimal contract is widely held
debt with face value 1.3125 (see the subsection entitled “Determination of
the Face Value of Unmonitored Debt”). Delegating monitoring to one agent
avoids duplication, but can cause incentive problems for the agent who was
delegated the monitoring task. Small lenders will not observe the effort put
into monitoring, or the information monitored by the agent. The agent (let’s
call him or her “the banker”) has a conﬂict of interest with the small lenders.
The conﬂict is similar to the conﬂict of interest between the borrower and
the small lenders. How can the monitoring task be delegated without the need
to monitor the monitor? The answer is for the banker to face liquidation as
a function of the amount paid to the 10,000 small lenders (depositors). This
provides incentives to the banker in the same way it does to a borrower: the
banker is always better off paying a sufﬁcient amount to avoid liquidation.
Liquidation is a sanction that the banker tries to avoid. For simplicity
and for symmetry with the assumption made about liquidation of borrowers’
projects, I assume that liquidation of the bank is only a sanction and yields
no cash to the small depositors or to the banker. There are several ways to
interpret this high cost of bank liquidation. One interpretation is that when too
little is paid to the depositors, the assets of the bank’s borrowers are liquidated
to make sure that the banker and the borrowers have not colluded to take
funds owed to depositors. Another interpretation is that liquidating the bank’s
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when there is a default on deposits, a banker who anticipates that the bank
is about to fail will reduce any discretionary component of monitoring. The
reduced monitoring will decrease the value of bank assets. The assumption
that borrowers and lenders get zero serves as a simple shorthand for these
more complicated aspects of the cost of bank liquidation.
Delegated Monitoring without Diversiﬁcation Does Not Succeed
Suppose that the banker monitors a single loan (runs a one-loan bank) on
behalf of the small lenders, and does not diversify across loans. When the
borrower’s project returns 1, the banker can monitor and collect the 1 without
actually liquidating. However, the bank itself would need to be liquidated in
this case, because the face value of the bank’s debt must exceed 1. If the bank’s
debt contract with the small depositors has a face value of 1 or less, the small
depositors never receive more than 1, which delivers less that the 1.05 expected
repayment they need to receive the required 5 percent expected return.6 If the
bank is liquidated when its loan defaults by paying 1, the bank is liquidated
whenever the borrower would have been liquidated, had the borrower used
widely held debt. Unless the 10,000 lenders each monitor the banker (costing
0.0002 each or a prohibitive total of 2), the one-loan bank will default and be
liquidated just as often as the borrower. This one-loan bank example seems to
imply that delegating the loan monitoring to the banker will not succeed.
Can the Banker Use Diversiﬁcation to Reduce Delegation Costs?
Suppose the banker monitored not one loan, but a diversiﬁed portfolio of loans.
A very simple way to show the value of diversiﬁcation is to examine the two-
loan bank. In particular, suppose the banker monitors the loans of two borrowers
whose returns are independently distributed but are otherwise just like that of
the single borrower (each loan has a 0.8 probability of returning 1.4 and a 0.2
probability of returning 1). The banker attracts 2 ($2 million) in “deposits”
from 20,000 investors and lends it out to two different borrowers. The banker
gives each borrower a debt contract with face F ($F million) and collects F
when the borrower has 1.4 and monitors to collect 1 when the borrower has
1. As a result, the banker does not need to use costly liquidation to enforce
his loan contract with either borrower. The banker issues unmonitored debt
6 In the text I ignore the $100 of capital that the banker can contribute, to simplify the
explanation. One can slightly lower the face value of debt issued to small outside lenders, but
the complication is not very informative. The banker has capital of his or her own to invest. The
bank need not raise 1 (million), but only 0.9999 (million). The expected repayment to give a 5
percent expected return is then (1.05)(0.9999) = 1.04995. This is equivalent to the case where
the banker has none of his own capital but outside investors require a 4.995 percent expected
return. The one-loan bank is not viable even when only a 4.995 percent return must be given to
outside depositors.D. W. Diamond: Financial Intermediation as Delegated Monitoring 61
deposits that are widely held, and the bank is liquidated whenever it pays less
than face value to any investor. This requires no monitoring by the 20,000 small
investors. Let B denote the face value of bank deposits per loan, implying that




Suppose the banker monitors both loans. If both borrowers pay in full, the
bank will receive 2F. If one defaults but not the other, the bank will receive
1+F. If both default, the bank will receive 1 from each, or 2. The diversiﬁcation
from having two borrowers borrow from the bank will reduce agency costs.
The distribution of payments to the bank, if the banker monitors, is as follows:
Payment Probability
Probability that
Payment is ≥ this value Explanation
2F 0.64[P2] 0.64 both pay F
F + 1 0.32[2(P)(1 − P)] 0.96 one pays F, one 1
2 0.04[(1 − P)2] 1.00 both pay 1
Assume that liquidating the bank yields nothing to depositors or to the
banker, similar to the liquidation of borrowing ﬁrms. The bank has total face
value of deposits of 2B. If the bank must be liquidated when it collects face
value of F from one borrower and 1 from the other, it will be liquidated when-
ever at least one loan defaults, and there will be no possible savings in costs of
ﬁnancial distress. Alternatively, if the bank can and will pay its deposits when
one loan defaults, it defaults only when both loans default, and it can reduce the
probability of liquidation to 0.04 = (1−P)2. To examine when payment of all
deposits is possible when just one loan defaults, the total payment received by
all depositors will be 2B with probability 0.96 and 0 with probability 0.04. The
expected payment is 0.96(2)B. The initial capital needed to make two loans is
2 ($2 million), and it requires a 5 percent expected rate of return, implying that
0.96(2)B = 2(1.05), or 2B = 2.1875, is the promised payment to 2 ($2 million)
in deposits. Equivalently, let the promised interest rate on bank deposits be rB.
Then, because 2B = 2(1 + rB), the promised interest rate on the bank deposit
is rB = 9.375%.
If the bank is to be able to pay 2.1875 when one loan defaults (paying 1)
and the other does not default (paying F), then 1 + F must be at least 2.1875,
and the face value of each loan must satisfy F ≥ 1.1875. If the bank made
loans with this face value, it could avoid liquidation with probability 0.96. In
summary, if the bank monitors its loans, it will have the cash and the incentives
to pay bank deposits in full with probability 0.96 so long as F ≥ 1.1875 or the
interest rate on bank loans is at least 18.75 percent.62 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Will the Bank Monitor?
A remaining question is whether the banker will choose to monitor the loans.
Without monitoring, the bank would not be able to offer to take 1 when only
1 is available and would instead liquidate the borrower’s asset. Monitoring
provides no beneﬁt to the banker when all loans pay in full (monitoring is not
needed to force a borrower to pay F) nor when all loans default (because the
bank fails and is liquidated). The entire increase in the banker’s return comes
from increasing the return when just one loan defaults.
If the banker who monitors obtains nothing whenever at least one loan
defaults, there will be no incentive to monitor. An incentive to monitor re-
quires that monitoring increases the bank’s expected payment by at least 0.0002
($200) per loan. If the banker monitors neither loan, then the bank will fail
when just one loan defaults, and the banker will get zero. If a loan that is
monitored defaults, and the other loan does not, the banker’s return will be
1+F−2B = 1+F−2.1875. This is the ex post increase in the banker’s return
due to monitoring. Monitoring one of the loans gives this increased return with
the probability that it alone defaults, or with probability 0.16. Monitoring of
one of the loans will be in the banker’s interest if 0.16(1+F−2.1875) exceeds
the cost of monitoring or 0.0002. Monitoring one loan will pay if F ≥ 1.18875.
Monitoring both loans gives the same increased return with the probability that
one of the two loans is the only default, or with probability 0.32. Monitoring
both loans is in the banker’s interest so long as 0.32(1 + F − 2.1875) exceeds
0.0004, which also implies F ≥ 1.18875. So long as the interest rate on bank
loans exceeds 18.875 percent, the banker is willing to invest $400 worth of
time to monitor all loans because it increases the value of his residual claim
on the bank.
The two-loan banker must earn a small proﬁt in excess of the cost of
monitoring. The need to provide the bank an incentive to monitor and to avoid
bank failure when just one loan defaults (by cross-subsidizing the losses from
the defaulting loan with the proﬁt from the nondefaulting loan) leads to proﬁts
for the banker who was delegated the monitoring of the loan. The banker will
monitor only if it yields a proﬁt, and due to limited liability and limited wealth,
the banker never makes deposit payments in excess of loan repayments. The
need to provide incentives puts a ﬂoor on the banker’s expected proﬁt, which
is sometimes called a control rent, because the banker’s control of decisions
requires that the rent (proﬁt) go to him. If further diversiﬁcation is not possible,
either because there are just two loans or because a two-eyed banker can only
monitor two loans, bank proﬁts cannot be driven to zero by competition. The
two-loan bank has the following proﬁts. The banker gets the residual claim
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2.3775 − 2.1875 = 0.19, with probability 0.64, when neither loan defaults;
2.18875 − 2.1875 = 0.00125, with probability 0.32, when one loan defaults;
and 0, with probability 0.04, when both loans default.
This works out to a total expected payment of 0.122 ($122,000) or
(0.19)0.64+(0.00125)0.32 = 0.122. This is a return to the banker of 0.061 per
loan, which is in excess of 0.0002 the cost per borrower of monitoring, and
the banker earns a control rent of 0.061 − 0.0002 = 0.0608.7
The delegation cost per borrower, D, equals the cost of ﬁnancial distress of
the bank or 0.04(2) = 0.08, plus control rent to the banker of 0.0608 or a total
of 0.1408. All parties are better off with the banker as delegated monitor. The
borrower prefers to borrow at 18.875 percent from the bank, versus at 31.25
percent direct. The investors get a 5 percent expected return in either situation.
The banker is happy with any claim with an expected payment above $400
and ends up with an expected payment of $122,000.
Summary of Financial Intermediation and Diversiﬁcation
I consider three types of contracting arrangements: (1) no monitoring: a widely
held traded debt contract with face = 1.3125 for each borrower; (2) direct mon-
itoring by investors, which saves distress costs of S = 0.2 but costs mK = 2;
and (3) delegated monitoring by an intermediary, which saves distress costs
S = 0.2 at cost monitoring plus delegation cost, K + D = 0.1408.
Diversiﬁcation within the intermediary works to make option (3) work
by reducing the liquidation cost of providing the bank an incentive to repay
small investors. To simplify, I use an example where the diversiﬁcation from
a bank making only two loans was sufﬁcient to give the bank reduced del-
egation costs. However, it is more generally true that diversiﬁcation allows
ﬁnancial intermediation to provide low-cost delegated monitoring. The law of
large numbers implies that if the bank gets sufﬁciently diversiﬁed across inde-
pendent loans with expected repayments in excess of the face value of bank
deposits, then the chance that it will default on its deposits gets arbitrarily close
to zero. In the limit of a perfectly diversiﬁed bank, the bank would never default
and would face no liquidation costs.8 In addition, the control rent needed to
7 One can do a bit better, as in footnote 6. The banker has capital of his or her own to
invest. The bank need not raise 2 (million), but only 1.9999 (million). The face value of bank
debt owed to depositors is then 1.99991.05
0.96 = 2.18739. This allows the face value of bank loans
to be reduced slightly. The binding constraint is the banker’s incentive to monitor, or 0.0004 ≤
0.32(1 + F − 2.18739), implying that the face value of bank debt is F = 1.188614 (instead of
1.18875). This leads to a payoff to the banker of 0.118721. Because the banker spends 0.0004 of
his time on monitoring and is owed 0.0001(1.05) for his 0.0001 capital, there is a total control
rent of 0.118216, or 0.059108 per loan.
8 For a formal limiting argument about well-diversiﬁed intermediaries, see Diamond (1984),
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provide incentives to monitor approaches zero. The delegation cost for the bank
approaches zero, and the only cost of intermediation is the (unavoidable) cost
of monitoring. Competitive and fully diversiﬁed intermediation would drive
borrowers’ expected cost of capital down to 5.02 percent. In the limit of perfect
diversiﬁcation, the face value of bank debt approaches F = 1.06275, which is
the solution to 0.8F + 0.2(1) = 1.0502; it gives the bank a 5 percent expected
return after covering the 0.0002 ($200) cost of monitoring. This is too strong
because in practice the default risk of borrowers is not independent, it is pos-
itively correlated. In addition, the number of loans in the bank’s portfolio is
limited.
The general message is that diversiﬁcation allows banks to transform mon-
itored debt into unmonitored debt, delegating the monitoring to bankers. The
banks’ organizational form minimizes the sum of monitoring and ﬁnancial
distress costs.
Policy Implications
There are important implications of this view of intermediaries. Because there
are costs of bank failure, and there are incentive beneﬁts from the bank receiv-
ing the proﬁt derived from its monitoring, banks can increase their value by
hedging or avoiding risks that they cannot control or reduce via monitoring. For
example, monitoring can do nothing to inﬂuence the level of riskless interest
rates. Thus, there is no incentive reason for the bank to bear general interest
rate risk. The bank’s high leverage means that a small loss might force a costly
default. Hedging of interest rate risk is desirable, through futures markets or
interest rate swaps, because it can remove risks that have no incentive value
to bank managers. Banks rely on diversiﬁcation to eliminate the risks of being
very highly levered. Unless a risk is intimately related to their monitoring task,
banks should avoid risks that are not diversiﬁable unless the bank can remove
the risk from its balance sheet through another (swap or futures) transaction.
Diversiﬁcation makes bank deposits much safer than bank loans, and in
the limit of fully diversiﬁed banks with independently distributed loans, bank
deposits become riskless. This suggests that even without deposit insurance,
deposits ought to be very low risk. Laws that limit bank diversiﬁcation remove
much of the technological advantage of the banking contract. The prohibition
on interstate banking in the United States, only recently eliminated, made dele-
gation costs much larger and banks much riskier than they would be without the
prohibition. The delegation cost from excessively limited diversiﬁcation has two
components. One is the increased probability of bank failure, which may also
have contributed to the historical political pressure for deposit insurance. The
other component is excessively high control rents: small undiversiﬁed banks
require higher levels of future proﬁts to remove their manager’s otherwise
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is large enough to have several competing, well-diversiﬁed intermediaries, the
increased diversiﬁcation from geographical deregulation may reduce manage-
rial moral hazard and help eliminate the need for high future bank proﬁts (high
charter value) to provide good incentives to bankers. If this is correct, banks
and similar ﬁnancial intermediaries will be more stable in the future than in
recent experience in the United States.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this article is to clarify the roles of debt and diversiﬁcation in the
ﬁnancial engineering that is banking. Debt has several roles related to ﬁnancial
intermediation. The right to liquidate on default provides any outside lender
with power over the borrower, inducing the borrower to repay the debt. This
power is limited by the borrower’s right to repay the debt in full and remove
the lender’s liquidation rights. However, liquidation is potentially inefﬁcient.
If the lender cannot monitor the borrower’s business, then the lender should
liquidate whenever there is a default, no matter what the cause. If the lender
can monitor the situation, then the ability to selectively remove the threat to
liquidate in return for a concession from the borrower can provide power over
the borrower without using inefﬁcient liquidation. Financial intermediaries such
as banks can centralize costly monitoring and avoid the duplication of effort
of the monitoring of borrowers by small investors. Banks monitor debt (loan)
contracts, and issue unmonitored debt (deposit) contracts. Diversiﬁcation is the
ﬁnancial-engineering technology that makes monitoring of deposit contracts
unnecessary when monitoring of loan contracts is necessary. This allows banks
to deliver delegated monitoring. Debt, monitoring, and diversiﬁcation are the
keys to understanding the link between ﬁnancial intermediation and delegated
monitoring.
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